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Administrative ProcedureADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT HELD NOT TO
AUTHORIZE EXTENSION OF ICC TEMPORARY
OPERATING PERMITS BEYOND STATUTORY LIMIT
Appellant, Steamship Corporation, applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a permanent certificate of public convenience and
necessity as a common carrier by water and, simultaneously, for temporary
authority to provide immediately a substantial portion of the proposed
services. Temporary authority was granted for 180 days, the maximum
period allowable under the Interstate Commerce Act.' In response to appellant's subsequent request, the Commission pursuant to its rules 2 implementing section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act,3 ordered
a continuation of the temporary authority until final determination of its
application for a permanent certificate. Appellees, railroad companies,
contested the Commission's order and obtained a decree vacating it in the
district court. 4 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the
ICA expressly limits the term of a temporary authority to 180 days, section
9(b) of the APA prevents termination of such authority before final
disposition of the application for the permanent certificate. Pan-Atlantic
S. S. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 353 U.S. 436 (1957).

Section 311 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act,5 enacted in 1940,
empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission, in its discretion and
without hearings, to grant temporary authority to water carriers to provide service "for which there is an immediate and urgent need" that
cannot be provided by existing carrier service. 6 The section is identical
to section 210a(a), 7 enacted in 1938, granting similar power to the Com1. Interstate Commerce Act, § 311 (aj, 54 STAT. 943 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 911(a)
(1952): "To enable the prbvisions of service for which there is an immediate and
urgent need to a point or points or within a territory having no carrier service capable of meeting such need, the Commission may, in its discretion and without hearings
or other proceedings, grant temporary authority for such service by a common carrier
by water or a contract carrier by water.... Such temporary authority shall be
valid for such time as the Commission shall specify, but not for more than an aggregate of one hundred and eighty days, and shall create no presumption that corresponding permanent authority will be granted thereafter."
2. 49 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.4 (Supp. 1956).
3. 60 STir. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (1952).
4. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 53 (D.Mass. 1956).
The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation
moved for leave to intervene under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1952).
5. See note 1 supra.

6. Ibid.
7.52 STAT. 1238.(1938), 49 U.S.C. § 310a(a) (1952).
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mission with respect to motor carriers. Until the enactment of section
210a(a) the only way in which a motor carrier could engage in interstate
commerce was to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity
in the case of a common carrier 8 or a permit in the case of a contract
carrier. 9 Such a certificate or permit could be issued only after formal
hearings at which the interests of potential competitors would be presented. 10 In 1938 the Commission requested power to issue immediate
temporary authority in instances of emergency to avoid the delay inherent
in formal proceedings." Congress granted the request but specifically
limited the term of such temporary authorities to 180 days.' 2 This specific
limitation was also included in the subsequently enacted provision empowering the Commission to grant temporary authority to water carriers.' 3
After the commencement of hostilities the Second War Powers Act of
194214 removed the 180 day limitation upon temporary authorities for
both motor' 5 and water 16 carriers until March 31, 1947.17 Prior to the
expiration date the Administrative Procedure Act' 8 was passed, providing
in section 9(b) that ". . .in any case in which the licensee has, in accordance with agency rules, made timely and sufficient application for a
renewal or a new license, no license with reference to any activity of a
continuing nature shall expire until such application shall have been finally
determined by the agency." 19 "Licenses" are defined in section 2(e) as
including "the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval...
or other form of permission." 20 The problem presented by the instant
case is whether section 9(b) of the APA authorizes the continued validity
of ICC temporary authorities beyond the 180 day term specified in the
ICA, pending final determination of an application for a permanent certificate or permit, or whether it encompasses only permanent 21 licenses.
8. 52 STAT. 1238 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 306 (1952).
9. 52 STAT. 1238 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 309 (1952).
10. This proposition is generally conceded. Instant case at 445 (dissent).
11. ICC letter of February 28, 1938 to Senate and House of Representatives,
S. Doc. No. 154, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
12. 52 STAT. 1238 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 310a(a) (1952).
13. See note 1 supra.
14. Act of Mar. 27, 1942, c. 199, 56 STAT. 176.
15. Act of Mar. 27, 1942, c. 199, 56 STAT. 177.
16. Ibid.
17. Section 1501 of the act originally provided for expiration on December 31,
1944, but that date was subsequently extended by amendments to March 31, 1947. 60
STAT. 345 (1946), 50 U.S.C. § 645(a) (1952).
18. 60 STAT. 237-44 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1952). September 11, 1946 was
designated as the effective date of the act. Ibid.
19. 60 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b) (1952).
20. 60 STAT. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (e) (1952).
21. "Permanent" in this context refers to any license granted by any agency after
full agency proceedings, regardless of its duration, and not solely to the Interstate
Commerce Commission certificates of public convenience and necessity which happen
to be granted for an indefinite period. Under the Federal Communications Act licenses
for operation of broadcasting stations may not be granted for a longer term than
three years. Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1084, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1952).
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In Stone's Express v. United States,2 the only previous case dealing with
the issue, the district court held that section 9(b) is inapplicable to temporary authorities.2 3 However, the instant Court, reached a contrary result, holding that in view of the injury to the carrier by virtue of loss of
investment and potential injury to the administrative system of the ICC,
section 9(b) of the APA should be construed as applying to temporary
24
authorities as well as to permanent licenses.
Since a temporary authority is clearly within the definition of a
"license" under section 2(e) of the APA 25 and a certificate of public
convenience and necessity is a "new license" under section 9(b),26 the
Court's decision does not appear to do violence to the language of the
latter section.2 7 In those cases in which the Commission desires to extend
the temporary authority until final determination of the application for a
permanent certificate it is probably justifiable as a circumvention of the
29
imadministrative difficulties 28 engendered by the 180 day limitation
posed on the duration of temporary authorities by the Interstate Commerce
Act. However, the Court's opinion is not clear as to the vitality remaining,
22. 122 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1954).
23. The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the order of the district court on the
ground of mootness. 350 U.S. 906 (1955).
24. Instant case at 440.
25. See text and note at note 20 supra.
26. Ibid. See note 27 infra.
27. The holder of a temporary authority would be a "licensee!' under section 9(b)
of the APA. See text and note at note 25 supra. Section 9(b) provides that "[I]n
any case in which the licensee has, in accordance with agency rules, made timely and
sufficient application for a renewal or a new license, no license with reference to any
activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such application shall have been
finally determined by the agency." 60 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(6) (1952).
The Court, in order to reach the result that the APA makes possible extension of the
temporary authority pending decision on the certificate of convenience and necessity,
had to find that the application made for the certificate of convenience and necessity,
as distinguished from the application for an extension of the temporary authority, was
the "application" made by the "licensee" within section 9(b). Were the "application" to
be treated as one only for renewal of the temporary authority, 9(b) then would
require merely that the old temporary authority not expire until the ICC decided
whether or not to extend it, without deciding whether the old authority could be
extended until final decision on the application for the permanent certificate. Thus,
only if the "application" were to be treated as one for the certificate (a "new
license"), would there be a determination of whether the existing license of the
"licensee," (his temporary authority) could expire prior to a decision on his new
license.
28. See instant case at 439-40. The temporary authority in the instant case was
granted on May 18, 1955. It remained before the Commission at least until the date
of the argument before the Supreme Court, April 23, 1957. Instant case at 436, 438,
445. The brief for the ICC indicates that approximately 19% of temporary permits
granted under §§ 210a and 311 (a) during the five year period ending January 1, 1957,
were extended beyond the original six month term. Brief for the ICC, p. 29, instant
case. Brief for Appellees, appendix A, p. 63, instant case. An independent examination of the Commission's public docket room in Washington, D. C. by representatives
of the Railroad-plaintiffs in the instant action revealed that of the 1,325 functional
orders issued by the Commission during the period January 1, 1952 to September 30,
1956, relative to licenses for motor carriers, 194 orders were for temporary permits,
99 orders were extensions of temporary permits. Of these 99 orders more than half
appear to have been extended for more than one and a half years beyond the statutory
term. Brief for Appellees, pp. 49-50, 63, instant case.
29. See text and notes at notes 12-13 supra.
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if there be any, to the congressional mandate that a temporary authority
shall be valid for not more than a 180 day period. If the carrier were to
ask for a renewal of its temporary authority without applying for a permanent certificate of public convenience and necessity, the Commission
probably would not be empowered to grant such an extension beyond 180
days, since section 9(b) does not confer on the Commission any licensing
power beyond that granted in the Interstate Commerce Act. If section
9(b) serves only to prevent the cessation of an existing license and not
to extend the licensing power of the Commission, the language of 9(b)
may operate to deprive the Commission of discretion to terminate a temporary authority where an application for a permanent certificate of public
convenience and necessity cannot finally be determined within 180 days.
The language of 9(b) is mandatory, providing that ". . .no license with
reference to any activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such
application shall have been finally determined by the agency." (Emphasis
added.) 30 Hence, it would seem that so long as the service being performed under the temporary authority is of a continuing nature the Commission will be denied discretion to terminate it, even though the emergency need which originally gave rise to the granting of the temporary
authority no longer exists. Ohn the other hand, a contrary result would
have left the Commission in the position of having to terminate a temporary authority prior to its reaching a final determination on the application for a permanent certificate even when it deemed the emergency situation to continue beyond the 180 day period. Faced with these alternatives,
either choice by the Court would have exposed defects in the administrative
process that require cure. The final settlement of the issues in the instant
case must be resolved by a legislative enactment expressly addressed to the
problem.

Conflict of LawsTORT ACTION IN STATE OF CONTRACT HELD NOT TO
BE BARRED BY CLAUSE IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION STATUTE OF STATE OF INJURY
MAKING DEFENDANT ONLY LIABLE
FOR COMPENSATION BENEFITS
Plaintiff, employee of a sub-contractor, sued defendant contractor
in a New Jersey court for injuries sustained while working on a building
repair project in Pennsylvania. Employee, sub-contractor, and contractor
were all New Jersey residents and the contracts of employment, both between employee and sub-contractor and between sub-contractor and contractor, were entered into in New Jersey. Prior to this action plaintiff
30. See text at note 19 supra.
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had collected New Jersey workmen's compensation benefits from the
sub-contractor's insurer. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that
the general rule of conflicts in tort cases, lex loci delecti,1 the law of the
place of injury, governed, and that under Pennsylvania law the tort claim
against the general contractor was barred by the Pennsylvania workmen's
compensation statute. Denying the motion, the court held that for purposes
of choice of law the substantive field involved was not tort law, but rather
one of "control of the employer-employee relationship," and that since
"the preponderance of significant contacts" 2 was in New Jersey, that
state's law applied, giving plaintiff a cause of action. Wilson v. Faull, 45
N.J. Super. 555, 133 A.2d 695 (App. Div.) cert. granted, 25 N.J. 53,
134 A.2d 832 (1957).
The Pennsylvania workmen's compensation statute, unlike that of
New Jersey, provides that an employee of a sub-contractor, while working
on premises occupied by or under the control of the general contractor
is a "statutory employee" of the general contractor and entitled to workmen's compensation benefits from him. 3 This remedy is exclusive and no
tort action will lie against either the sub-contractor or the general contractor.4 In New Jersey, the workman is treated solely as the employee of the
sub-contractor, from whom he is entitled to workmen's compensation benefits. He may then maintain an action against the general contractor as a
third party tortfeasor, 5 the sub-contractor or his insurer being subrogated,
however, to the rights of the employee to the amount of any workmen's
compensation benefits paid.6 All forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have workmen's compensation statutes. 7 Forty-two of these
jurisdictions have provisions comparable to the Pennsylvania act making a
general contractor a "statutory employer" for purposes of workmen's
compensation coverage if certain conditions are fulfilled.8 In the other
seven states 9 the general contractor is liable only for common-law damages
if negligent. In the situation presented by the instant case thirty-three of
1. 2 BEA.LE, CoNF

rcT
OF LAws

§ 378.3-4 (1935) ;

GOODRICH, CONFLIcT OF LAWS

88 92, 93 (3d ed. 1949) ; RESTATEI ENT, CONFLICTS § 378-9 (1934).
2. Instant case at 569, 133 A2d at 702.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 52-462 (Purdon 1952).
4. Capetola v. Barclay White Co., 139 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 799 (1944).
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-40 (Supp. 1956). The general contractor is liable for
compensation if the sub-contractor is uninsured. He then receives a cause of action
against the sub-contractor but is not immune from common-law suit by the employee.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-79 (1940); Corbett v. Starrett Bros., 105 N.J.L. 228, 143
At. 352 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); ef. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWv
§ 72:31 (1952) (hereinafter cited as LARSON).
6. United States Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. Super. 444, 67 A.2d
880 (App. Div. 1949), rev'd on other ground., 4 N.J. 157, 72 A.2d 190 (1950).
7. 1 LARSON § 5.30. Mississippi, in 1949, was the final state to come under the
system.
8. 2 LARSON § 72.31. The District of Columbia statute which is pertinent is 44
STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 904(a) (1952).
9. California, Delaware, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
and West Virginia. 2 LARSON § 72.31.
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the forty-one "statutory-employer" jurisdictions apparently would grant
the general contractor immunity from common-law suit if he is ultimately
responsible under the act for compensation 10 while eight 11 would appear
to adopt the New Jersey view and hold the general contractor liable for
common-law damages and compensation coverage. In these eight jurisdictions the general contractor would then have either the right to deduct
2
the amount of the compensation award from a judgment for damages1
or have a cause of action against the sub-contractor for the amount of
the award. 13
Where the issue is which of two or more workmen's compensation
statutes is to be applied for the purpose of awarding benefits, the state
of injury has in some cases relegated1 4 the injured employee to his compensation remedy in the jurisdiction in which the contract of employment
was entered into 15 and in other cases has applied its own statute. 16 So
also, the state of contract has both deferred to the state of injury '" and
has applied its own statute. 8 For the forum to apply its own statute, the
full faith and credit clause has been held to require only that the forum have
a "substantial interest involved." 19 As a matter of choice of law it has been
urged that the correct rule should be that the compensation law of the
jurisdiction with a preponderance of contracts in the particular case should
govern.2 0 Where the issue is whether a forum which permits a commonlaw tort action against a general contractor should respect the bar to such
10. See 3 SCHNmER, WORK EN'S COMPENSATION §§ 852-903 (3d ed. Supp. 1957).
11. Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
See 3 ScHuzmm, op. cit. supranote 10, §§ 855, 865, 871, 881, 884, 886, 903.
12. E.g., Culbertson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 197 Wis. 349, 222 N.W. 249
(1928).
13. E.g., N. J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-79 (1940).
14. If the forum decides not to apply its own compensation statute, it will rarely
enforce the statute of another state since such statutes are usually administered by
commissions rather than judicially. See cases collected in Note, 6 VAlD. L. RIv. 744
(1953).
15. Spohn v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ohio St. 42, 32 N.E.2d 554 (1941) ; House
v. State Industrial Accident Comm'n, 167 Ore. 257, 117 P.2d 611 (1941); Sherk v.
Department of Labor and Industries, 189 Wash. 460, 65 P.2d 1269 (1937).
16. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939). California was permitted to award compensation although the employee was
temporarily in the state on business from Massachusetts.
17. North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93 (1916);
Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693 (1913); Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler
Co., 224 N.Y. 9, 119 N.E. 878 (1918).

18. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Rounsaville v. Cen-

tral R.R., 87 N.J.L. 371, 94 Atl. 392 (S. Ct. 1915); Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R.I.
447, 98 Atl. 103 (1916).
19. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
An employee was injured in Alaska on a seasonal job and was returned to California
where he was permitted to apply for compensation despite his Alaskan contract, site
of injury and coverage. The forum was held to have a legitimate public interest in
providing for the welfare of its own citizens via compensation.
20. 2 LARsoN § 87.40; Note, Extra-TerritorialApplication of Workmen's Compensation Laws-A Suggested Solution, 33 T4XAs L. Riv. 917 (1955).
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an action raised by the compensation statute of another jurisdiction
having contact with the particular case, it has generally been held that the
bar will be respected. 2' This has been true whether the forum was the
state of injury 22 or the state of contract. 23 However, the Supreme Court
in Carroll v. Lanza24 held that the full faith and credit clause does not
require that the state of injury give effect to the bar of the state of contract. The instant case appears to be the first in which the state of contract has refused to recognize the bar of the state of injury.2 5 The question
21. Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 221 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1955) and
cases collected therein; Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.
1954) (Employee resident of District of Columbia sued his general contractor at
common law for damages occuring on the job in Maryland; held that an award under
the Maryland compensation act was his remedy); Beyer v. Hamburg-Am. S.S., 171
Fed. 582 (C.C.S.DN.Y. 1909); Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 157
Ark. 528, 249 S.W. 21 (1923) ; Mitchell v. Tobin Constr. Co., 236 Mo. App. 910, 159
S.W.2d 709 (1942) ; Pendar v. H. & B. Am. Mach. Co., 35 R.I. 321, 87 Atl. 1 (1913).
See also Parker v. Zanghi, 45 N.J. Super. 167, 131 A.2d 802 (App. Div. 1957) (court
denied an employee of sub-contractor injured in Pennsylvania a common-law action
against a general contractor under a fact situation somewhat related to the instant
case). Cf. Ogino v. Black, 278 App. Div. 146, 104 N.Y.S2d 82 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd,
304 N.Y. 872, 109 N.E.2d 884 (1952). RESTATE SENT, CoNrucr OF LAWs § 401 (Supp.
1948) ; Notes, 67 HARv. L. Rrv. 1008 (1954), 39 VA.. L. Rzv. 951 (1953). See generally CHATrHAm, GoomicH, G~uswoLD, Ris, CoNrLICT ov LAws 473-84 (4th ed.
1957).
22. E.g., Willingham v. Eastern Airlines, 199 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952); Severson
v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines, 105 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Scott v. White Eagle
Oil & Refining Co., 47 F.2d 615 (D. Kan. 1930); Johnson v. Nelson, 128 Minn. 158,
150 N.W. 620 (1915); Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N.Y. 531, 125
N.E. 675 (1920). Cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner, 188 Ark. 177, 65 S.W.2d
1 (1933); Mitchell v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 202 Mo. App. 251, 215
S.W. 506 (1919). But see Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65 (1st
Cir. 1944). See STUMBRG, CoNvLicr op LAws 222 (2d ed. 1951): "The fact that
the injury is governed by a workmen's compensation act, which it is conceded at the
forum properly applies, should preclude recovery in another state upon some independent theory of liability."
The state of injury has, however, refused to recognize its own statutory bar
and recognized the third party common-law action permitted by the state of contract.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goode Const. Co., 97 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1951); Miller
v. Yellow Cab Co., 308 Ill. App. 217, 31 N.E.2d 406 (1941); cf. Kelly v. Summers,
210 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954); Hynes v. Indian Trails, 181 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1950);
Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E.2d 14 (1940).
23. E.g., Tucker v. Texas Co., 203 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1953); Hockmuth v. Perkins, 55 Ga. App. 649, 191 S.E. 156 (1937); Orleans Dredging Co. v. Frazie, 179
Miss. 188, 173 So. 431 (1937) ; ef. Jewtraw v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 280
App. Div. 150, 112 N.Y.S.2d 727 (3d Dep't 1952).
24. 349 U.S. 408 (1955). An employee of a sub-contractor doing work for a
general contractor was injured as a result of the latter's negligence. The injury occurred in Arkansas but the employee and sub-contractor were residents of Missouri
which provided exclusive remedies by its compensation statute. The employee collected
his Missouri award and sued the general contractor for damages in Arkansas. It was
held that the Missouri award under an exclusive remedy statute did not bar the common-law suit at the place of injury.
25. With the possible exception of Standard Oil v. Lyons, 130 F.2d 965 (8th
Cir. 1942), where the plaintiff and defendant, not in privity of contract, both came
under the broad immunity granted to all persons who are covered by the Illinois act,
and plaintiff also came under the Iowa act by virtue of a contract of employment in
that state. The Federal District Court of Iowa held that the Illinois statute was no
bar to a common-law third party action. See also Johnson v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry.,
191 N.C. 75, 131 S.E. 390 (1926), where North Carolina, not having a workmen s
compensation act, refused to recognize the bar to a common-law suit under the Tennessee act.
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of the effect of the full faith and credit clause was not properly raised by
26
the parties, hence the decision rested solely on choice of law principles.
In determining what substantive field of law was involved for purpose
of selecting the proper choice of law rule, the instant court found that the
Pennsylvania bar to a common-law tort action against the general contractor was not part of its tort law but was an integral part of Pennsylvania's workmen's compensation scheme.27 Likewise the absence of such
a bar in the New Jersey statute and availability of a common-law remedy
were found to be a part of the New Jersey compensation scheme insofar
as the tort action makes possible recovery of a fund from a faulty general
contractor out of which the sub-contractor or his insurance carrier can
recoup compensation payments.2 8 Concluding that the applicable substantive field was "control of the employer-employee relationship," the court
rejected the defendant's contention that it was bound by the generally accepted tort choice of law rule that the lex loci delicti governs.2 Instead
it accepted as the proper choice of law rule the rule formulated to determine which of two or more compensation statutes should apply-the law
of the state with a preponderance of contacts should governY0
Although the court did not articulate the basis of the cause of action
which it found available to the plaintiff-employee in the instant case, it
would appear that it was enforcing a Pennsylvania cause of action arising
from a Pennsylvania wrong without giving effect to the defense available
to the general contractor in that state. At least it seems fair to assume
that at trial plaintiff would have to prove negligence on the part of the
general contractor under Pennsylvania law. Regardless of the court's
characterization of the substantive field involved, principles of comity
26. Instant case at 572, 131 A.2d at 704. The decision may satisfy the full faith and
credit issue, however. See the statement by Justice Douglas in Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. at 413: ". . . [W]e write not only for this case and this day alone, but for this
type of case." There, however, the state of injury refused to imply the bar of the
state of contract.
27. Instant case at 563, 133 A.2d at 698.
28. Instant case at 565, 133 A.2d at 700.
29. Goodrich assigns as the practical reasons for the rule lex loci delecti the
following: It is the only law in control at the place where the injury complained of
occurred; its application is foreseeable by both parties to the suit, not merely one;
and one party does not benefit by the fortuitous choice of the forum. GOODRIcl, op.
cit. supra note 1, § 92.
30. See Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
at 419, for a discussion of the Court's use of this approach for purposes of the full
faith and credit clause. "The relevant considerations have been the place of the employment contract; the residence of the parties; the place of injury; the possibility
of the workman becoming a public charge in the [forum] ... the interest of a State
in securing prompt payment of medical fees from its residents . . .the aspect of the
exclusiveness of the foreign statute . . .the State's interest in the bodily safety and
economic protection of the workers within it; the difference between a defense (which
if rejected results in irremedial liability) and a cause of action (which if not allowed
in one State can be pursued in another) . . .the amount of work to be performed in a
State ... and the policy of determinate liability and prompt remedy underlying
workmen's compensation acts." Cf. Buccheri v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 19 N.J.
594, 118 A.2d 21 (1955), for New Jersey comment on the "interest weighing approach." See Langschmidt, Choice of Law in Worknzens Compensation, 24 TZNN.
L. Rxv. 322 (1956).
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would seem to require that the New Jersey court only refuse to honor
the Pennsylvania defense if the defense were offensive to the forum's
policy. 3' From the standpoint of the New Jersey workmen's compensation
program the purpose to be served by making available a cause of action
against a faulty general contractor is that a fund may thereby be created
for reimbursement of the sub-contractor or his insurance carrier, thus
32
increasing their financial ability to make future compensation payments.
This purpose would be frustrated by absolving the general contractor
from all liability. But the purpose would be adequately served by permitting recovery against the general contractor in the amount of the compensation liability incurred by the sub-contractor, an alternative which the
court apparently failed to consider. Making the general contractor unlimitedly liable, i. e., refusing to recognize his defense under Pennsylvania
law to a common-law tort claim, exceeds the necessities of the situation
from the New Jersey compensation standpoint. The New Jersey compensation policy of reimbursing sub-contractors at the expense of faulty
general contractors is affronted only if the general contractor is given
an absolute defense. It is not affronted if he is given a defense to liability
in excess of the amount required for compensation payments.
From the injured employee's standpoint, the fact that under the New
Jersey statute he is not denied a common-law remedy against a faulty general contractor may be indicative of a domestic policy of sufficient importance to require that the New Jersey court not honor the Pennsylvania
defense. Thus, New Jersey's policy would appear to be to maximize the recovery of an injured employee. However, it is clear that as to plaintiffs injured in Pennsylvania but resident in New Jersey and not covered by workmen's compensation, the New Jersey court would apply Pennsylvania tort
law including any available defenses.3 3 The differences in the instant case
from the general action based on negligence are that the defense is one arising from the Pennsylvania compensation statute because of the general con31. The instant court did not find the Pennsylvania act "obnoxious to the public
policy of New Jersey." In Bowers v. American Bridge Co., 43 N.J. Super. 48, 127
A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1956), the instant court declared that certain provisions of the

Pennsylvania act were obnoxious to its public policy, i.e., those governing the amount

and termination procedure of the Pennsylvania award. The entire Pennsylvania act
has not been considered "obnoxious" by New Jersey's highest court and therefore

could be afforded comity. In Stacy v. Greenberg, 9 N.J. 390, 88 A-2d 619 (1952),
Brennan, J. stated: 'Well established principles of comity require that our courts
give full effect to the New York statute under the facts presented here." A New
York resident who was injured in New Jersey was attempting to bring a third party
action which was barred by the .New York workmen's compensation statute but which
was permitted under the New Jersey act. Cf. English v. Stokes Molded Products, 43
N.J. Super. 68, 127 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1956).
32. Instant case at 565, 133 A.2d at 700.
33. Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953), citing
with approval Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 439, 46 N.E2d 509 (1943), and Howard
v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931). But see Koplik v. C. P. Trucking
Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 196, 135 A.2d 555, 556 (App. Div. 1957), for interesting dictum
by the New Jersey court on the basis of the instant case to the effect that suits for
common-law damages between husband and wife may be more aptly characterized by
the forum as substantive problems in family law and not in tort for purposes of
choice of law.
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tractor's position in the Pennsylvania compensation scheme, and the fact
that plaintiff has received New Jersey compensation benefits thus subrogating the sub-contractor to any recovery in the amount of his compensation liablity. Neither of these differences seem sufficient to warrant
unique treatment for the injured employee. Nor does characterization of
the applicable field of law as one of control of the employment relation
supply a reason for distinguishing the cases. If there is no distinction,
comity would require recognition of the bar of the place of injury to the
same extent that any other defense is recognized in negligence actions.
All states, in adopting workmen's compensation programs, have accepted the basic philosophy of workmen's compensation: speedy, sure
recovery for the injured employee and absolute but determinant liability for
the employer made responsible for compensation, with ultimate passage
of the cost of work injuries to the employer's customers.3 Thus, in each
jurisdiction an employer, either the general contractor or the sub-contractor, is designated to bear primary financial responsibility for compensation payments. 35 Through compensation insurance the employers designated spread their risk, passing the cost of the insurance on to the customer. A settled relationship is thereby created. Since not all states fix
compensation liability on the same "employer," utilization of a preponderance of contracts theory in determining the liability of the general
contractor, dependent as it is upon fortuitous combinations of places
of injury, contract and residence, interjects uncertainty into the compensation system. The general contractor, liable only for compensation in one jurisdiction, may under this rule become unlimitedly liable
in another jurisdiction with which he has contact. The result is a potentially higher insurance premium burden and the risk of judgments beyond
the limits of the coverage purchased3 6 But in adopting workmen's compensation as the remedy for work injuries, the forum has adopted a policy
of certainty in the compensation relationship. This policy seems strong
enough to affirmatively require the forum to respect the sister state's compensation scheme even though the sister state may have selected a different
person to bear responsibility for compensation. Which employer-the general contractor or the sub-contractor-bears responsibility is a matter of
detail to be worked out within the larger context of the workmen's compensation philosophy. 37 Thus, not only comity but also the domestic policy of
34. Stone, The Forum's Policy and the Defense of Faith and Credit to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 41 IowA L. Rv. 558, 589 (1956).
35. 1 LAxsoN § 49.11. Liability is usually secondary for the general contractor
but may be joint or primary.
36. Stone, supra note 34, at 591.
37. E.g., 2 LARsoN § 72.50. "As a matter of basic compensation theory, once you
have decided to extend immunity beyond the employer himself ... there is really no
good reason to stop short of including everyone in the system . . .the mutual give
and take affects everyone under the system .... If the purpose of the [compensation]
legislation was to dispense with common law personal injury litigation for the benefit
of members of the system, all members should benefit alike, and not be subdivided
into arbitrary little clusters within which the immunity applies .... In most instances,
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the forum may demand respect for the sister state's bar to the general
contractor's unlimited liability.3 8 However, neither comity nor the forum's
policy requires that the forum completely absolve the general contractor.
It would therefore seem desirable for the New Jersey court to consider the
alternative of a subrogation remedy against the general contractor in the
amount of the sub-contractor's compensation liability. 39

Fraudulent ConveyancesINSOLVENT DEBTOR'S IMPROVEMENTS TO PROPERTY
HELD UNDER A LIFE ESTATE CONSTITUTES A
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE TO A REMAINDERMAN
WHO FURNISHES NO CONSIDERATION
An insolvent debtor spent $136,000 for buildings and other improvements to a dairy farm in which he had a life estate. After his death, the
United States brought suit against the remainderman to recover the value
of the improvements in satisfaction of an assessment for unpaid taxes of
the insolvent debtor for the years in which the improvements were made,
alleging that the improvements constituted a fraudulent conveyance under
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.' The court overruled remainderman's motion for summary judgment,2 holding that such improvements
the defendant who actually gains by the immunity is himself an employer, whose
liability is only vicarious; and so the moral argument of reaching the actual wrongdoer breaks down in the great majority of the cases." Ibid.
38. Stone, supra note 34, at 589-91.
39. At present, the New Jersey compensation statute provides a remedy for the
sub-contractor against a faulty general contractor only if the injured employee has
not within one year effected a settlement with the general contractor or instituted
proceedings against him. The court would have to imply an immediate cause of action
for the sub-contractor against the general contractor from the Pennsylvania compensation scheme. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-40 (f) (Supp. 1956): "When an injured employee or his dependents fail within 1 year of the accident to either effect a
settlement with the third person or his insurance carrier or institute proceedings for
recovery of damages for his injuries and loss against the third person, the employer
or his insurance carrier . . .can either effect a settlement with the third person or
his insurance carrier or institute proceedings against the third person for the recovery
of damages for the injuries and loss sustained by such injured employee or his dependents and any settlement made with the third person or his insurance carrier or
proceedings had and taken by such employer or his insurance carrier against such
third person, and such right of action shall be only for such right of action that the
injured employee or his dependents would have had agabtst the third person, and shall
constitute a bar to any further claim of action by the injured employee or his dependents against the third person." (Emphasis added.) This section may be construed
so as to limit the employee's action against the third person to the amount of compensation available to him under the New Jersey act. Thus the compensation fund
is replenished by the general contractor and the statutory bar is respected.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 351-63 (Purdon 1954). State law is applicable since
the Government elected to bring the action under the above act, although federal law
might have been applicable under the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 311, as amended, 56
STAT. 957 (1942). See instant case at 530 n.2. The exact amount of the expenditure
was $136,768.83. Instant case at 530.
2. The court also overruled decedent estate's motion to dismiss. The court treated
para. 4 and para. 5 of remainderman's motion for summary judgment as a motion for
a more definite statement and, as such, granted it. There remains to be settled both
what improvements were made and the date of Schofield's insolvency.
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constitute a fraudulent conveyance, and as such are recoverable out of the
remainderman's interest. United States v. Schofield, 152 F. Supp. 529
(E.D. Pa. 1957).
3

The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, adopted in twenty states,
4
is a codification of the common law, permitting creditors to set aside
5
any conveyance by the grantor-debtor determined to be "fraudulent"
under the act.6 Every conveyance made by an insolvent debtor is fraudulent as to creditors, 7 regardless of actual intent," unless it is made to a
9
bona fide purchaser for value. Thus a gift of personalty or realty can be
10
set aside under the act if made by an insolvent debtor. Likewise a conveyance of assets by an insolvent to trustees in spendthrift trust for his
own benefit has been held voidable by creditors." A more difficult problem arises when the insolvent improves real estate that is not subject to
creditors' claims. Improvements to real property are held to be part of the
freehold estate; title to them passes immediately to the owner of the land
upon which they are made. 12 Thus a creditor cannot simply void the convey13
ance and take back what the grantee received, for he must contend with
the conflicting claims of the owner of the freehold estate. This problem
arises typically with regard to improvements by a husband on land held by
3. 9B UNIFORm LAws ANN. 45 (1957).
4. Westminster Say. Bank v. Sauble, 183 Md. 628, 632, 39 A.2d 862, 864 (1944);
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIVORM STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS
251 (1917).
5. Conveyance is defined as including "every payment of money, assignment, release, transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property.."
UNFORM FRAUDULENT CONVzYANC_ ACT § 1 (hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT)
(PA. ST'ATr. ANN. tit. 39, § 351 (Purdon 1954)).
6. UNIFORM ACT § 4 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 354 (Purdon 1954)).
7. The act also applies to conveyances which render debtors insolvent. UNiFORM
ACT § 4 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 354 (Purdon 1954)).
8. Ibid. Drury v. State Capitol Bank, 163 Md. 84, 161 Atl. 176 (1932) ; Bean v.
Quirin, 87 N.H. 343, 179 Atl. 421, aff'd on rehearing,87 N.H. 343, 180 Atl. 251 (1935) ;
Dixon v. Eckert, 117 N.J. Eq. 544, 176 Atl. 560 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); Toff v.
Vlahakis, 380 Pa. 512, 112 A.2d 340 (1955).
9. UNmRm AcT § 9 (PA. SrATr. ANN. fit. 39, § 359 (Purdon 1954)).
10. Davis v. Hudson Trust Co., 28 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1928); Swartz v. Bachman, 267 Pa. 185, 110 At. 260 (1920); Bowery v. Vines, 178 Tenn. 98, 101, 156
S.W.2d 395, 397 (1941); 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFEREN cES
§ 268 (1940).
11. Sines v. Shipes, 192 Md. 139, 63 A.2d 748 (1949); Bowers' Trust Estate,
346 Pa. 85, 89, 29 A.2d 519, 521 (1943) ; State ex rel. v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn.
App. 388, 190 S.W.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied (Tenn. 1945).
12. Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v. Sistersville Brewing Co., 233 U.S. 712, 717
(1914); Porter v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 122 U.S. 267 (1887); Pierce v.
Goddard, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 559, 562 (1839); McCullough v. Irvine's Executors,
13 Pa. 438 (1850) ; 1 AMERICAN LAW OV PROPERTY § 2.16(f) (Casner ed. 1952). In
the McCullough case supra, the court held the life tenant liable for waste for tearing
down the buildings that he had erected. It would follow that in the instant case,
where the freehold interests consisted of a life estate in debtor and a remainder, these
interests attached to the improvements, the debtor retaining only a life estate in them.
13. The reason for having title pass when the improvement is made is to prevent
possible harm to the real property which might result from removal of the improvements. 5 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.8 (Casner ed. 1952).
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him and his wife as tenants by the entireties. 14 Since a creditor of one spouse
cannot ordinarily execute on property held by the entireties,' 5 if the debtor
were permitted to put all of his assets into improvements on such land,
they would become part of the realty and exempt from the creditors'
claims. To avoid this result courts usually have held that such improvements constitute a fraudulent conveyance and allow the creditor to recover
out of the grantee's estate. 16 Determination in the instant case that improvement of real property by an insolvent life tenant 17 may be brought
under the act extends the scope of the transfers-by-improvement rule
developed in the entireties cases in that the assets were not immediately
put out of the creditors' reach; creditors could have levied on the life
interest. 18
The decision in the instant case imposes possible hardships on the
remainderman. By holding that creditors are entitled to the enhancement
in the value of the property traceable to the improvements, the court
creates for the remainderman a problem of satisfaction of the claim. In
a few cases creditors may be willing to realize on the improvements by
purchasing the remainderman's interest, thus giving them an absolute interest in the land. Since this alternative would require the consent of the
remainderman, agreement among the creditors and an outlay of assets by
the creditors, its use will be relatively limited. In general, therefore, the
remainderman will be called upon to deliver assets to the creditor. Two
alternatives are open to him. Since improvements cannot easily be removed
from real estate as a rule, 19 the remainderman will be able to settle the
14. See cases cited at note 16 infra. The problem has also arisen as a result of the
debtor's placing improvements on the property of a third person, usually with that
person's knowledge of the scheme. Such improvements are held to be fraudulent conveyances. Pierce v. Pierce, 238 Ky. 495, 38 S.W.2d 254 (1931) ; Peoples Nat'l Bank
v. Loeffert, 184 Pa. 164, 38 Atl. 996 (1898) ; Nat'l Valley Bank v. Hancock, 100 Va.
101, 105, 40 S.E. 611, 612-13 (1902); Vandevort v. Fouse, 52 W. Va. 214, 43 S.E.
112 (1902) ; 1 GINN, op. cit. spra note 10, § 212.
15. Carlisle v. Parker, 38 Del. 83, 188 Atl. 67 (1936) ; Richardson v. Grill, 138
Fla. 787, 190 So. 255 (1939) ; Blenard v. Blenard, 185 Md. 548, 560, 45 A.2d 335, 340
(1946) ; Murphy v. C. I. T. Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 594, 33 A.2d 16, 18 (1943).
16. Glazer v. Beer, 343 Mich. 495, 72 N.W.2d 141 (1955); Foster v. Knowles,
42 N.J. Eq. 226, 7 Atl. 290 (Ct. Err. & App. 1886); Amadon v. Amadon, 359 Pa.
434, 59 A.2d 135 (1948). But see Taylor v. Carraway, 282 Fed. 878 (E.D.N.C. 1922).
The courts explain this result by saying, "Before increasing the amount of his mvestment in execution proof property, it is defendant's duty to pay his debts." First
State Bank v. Wallace, 201 Mich. 673, 679, 167 N.W. 887 (1918).
17. The value of the life estate must be less than the creditors' claims. If the life
estate would cover all of the creditors' claims, then the debtor would not be insolvent
within the meaning of § 4 of the act.
18. The creditor of a life tenant can execute on the property to the extent of the
life tenant's interest. Alexander v. Goellert, 153 Kan. 202, 109 P.2d 146 (1941) ; Mizell
v. Bazemore, 194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453 (1927); Ehrisman v. Sener, 162 Pa. 577,
29 Atl. 719 (1894); Tscherne v. Crane-Johnson Co., 56 S.D. 101, 107, 227 N.W. 479,
431 (1929) ; RzSTATvzxMT, PROPERTY § 147 (1936). In the instant case this remedy
was unavailable to the creditor as the life tenant's interest was extinguished by his
death, prior to the institution of suit by the creditor.
19. But see State ex reL v. Nashville Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 388, 190 S.W.2d
785 (1944), cert. denied (Tenn. 1945), a case where a son placed improvements on
his father's land, and the father then conveyed the land to trustees in spendthrift
trust for his son. The court held the conveyance to be fraudulent. However, it further held that the improvements could not be severed, allowing the creditors only a
lien on the land.
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claim of creditors to the improvements 20 only by either payment from his
other assets if he wishes to retain both land and improvements or by sale
of the land and use of the proceeds to pay the claim.2 ' The remainderman
is forced in either case to part with certain of his assets in order to retain
others. Although courts have been willing to permit this hardship in cases
involving land held by the entireties, 22 one of the strong reasons for holding a conveyance to be fraudulent in those cases is absent here. In entireties cases the debtor's assets are immediately placed out of the reach of
creditors, yet the debtor retains beneficial enjoyment of the property without the property being subject to the risks of his enterprise.P The same
rationale underlies the cases holding conveyances of assets by insolvents
to trustees in spendthrift trust for themselves to be voidable by creditors.2 4
In the case of improvement of real estate by an insolvent life tenant, the
debtor's interest in the property remains subject to execution at any time
before termination of his estate.2 5 Thus, creditors are not placed in the
same position as they would be in the entireties and spendthrift trust cases
but for the fraudulent conveyance rule.
On the other hand, the purpose of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is "to prevent debtors from putting property which is available
for the payment of their debts beyond the reach of their creditors."

28

It

has been suggested that the test for this is whether the debtor's estate has
been in any way diminished.27 Were improvement of real estate by an
insolvent life tenant held not to be a fraudulent conveyance, his creditors
would still be able to execute upon his life interest, the value of which will
have been increased by the improvements.2 8 However, the dollar increase
20. The instant court suggested that the value of the improvements conveyed to
the remainderman should be the lesser of the following amounts: the amount spent
for the improvements or the added value of the land at the time of the life tenant's
death resulting from the improvements. Instant case at 534.
21. In Amadon v. Amadon, 359 Pa. 434, 59 A.2d 135 (1948), a husband had
placed a hospital on land held by the entireties. The creditor was held entitled to a
decree requiring payment of the sum that went into the improvements and in default
thereof entitled to execution against the hospital.
22. See cases note 16 supra.
23. Property held by the entireties is not subject to one spouse's creditors even
while that spouse is living on the property. See cases note 15 supra. See also cases
involving conveyances by an insolvent to relatives or close friends in which the grantor
continues to use the land as his own. In these cases the conveyance has been held to
be fraudulent. Lynch v. La Fonte, 37 F. Supp. 499, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Morton
Hardware Co. v. Barranco, 233 Ala. 346, 172 So. 109 (1937) ; Benley v. Caille, 289
Mich. 74, 286 N.W. 163 (1930); Mullin v. Trolinger, 237 Mo. App. 939, 947, 179
S.W.2d 484, 488 (1944); Clark v. Beltz, 179 Pa. Super. 456, 460, 116 A.2d 85, 87
(1955).
24. See cases note 11 supra.
25. See cases note 18 supra. However, the increase in the value of the life estate
resulting from the improvements will not be as great as the amount expended for
the improvements. A portion of the increase in the value of the whole estate will
accrue to the remainderman.
26. Kummet v. Thielen, 210 Minn. 302, 306, 298 N.W. 245, 247 (1941).
27. 1 GLrNN, op. cit. supr note 10, § 195.
28. In Pennsylvania valuation of a life estate is sometimes based on life expectancy tables and sometimes made one-third the value of the whole estate. McCommon
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in the value of the life estate will not equal the increase in the value of the
land traceable to the improvements since a portion of the enhancement
of the property's value will accrue to the remainder interest. Thus, conversion of otherwise available assets into improvements of real estate
would result in a diminution of the sum of the assets subject to execution
by creditors. But by holding that the improvements are a fraudulent conveyance, creditors are permitted to claim the whole of the increase of the
value of the land resulting from the improvements. A diminution in the
debtor's estate is prevented, a result consistent with the purpose of the
act.
Either result in the instant case will cause hardship to one of two
innocent parties-the creditor or the remainderman. The hardship upon
the remainderman is one difficult to place a value upon: He must make
a selection from among his assets in order to satisfy the creditors' claim
if the conveyance is held to be fraudulent. Having satisfied the claim,
however, he will be left with assets equivalent in value to those he would
have had had the life tenant made no improvements. On the other hand,
holding the conveyance not to be fraudulent would result in financial loss
to creditors. In balance, this measurable loss calls for the decision reached
by the instant court.

Securities RegulationANNUITY PLAN OFFERING RETURNS VARYING WITH
INVESTMENT EXPERIENCE EXEMPT FROM SEC
REGULATION BY McCARRAN-FERGUSON
INSURANCE ACT OF 1945
The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company (VALIC), a corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia, offered
combination life insurance and variable annuity policies for sale in the
District' following approval by the District Insurance Superintendent as
required by District law.2 Under the terms of the variable annuity conv. Johnson, 123 Pa. Super. 581, 187 Atl. 445 (1936). Cf. the method used by the In-

ternal Revenue Service for valuation of life estates for tax purposes. U.S. Treas. Reg.
105, § 81.10(i) (5) (1954). Execution on a life estate, which gives the creditor an
estate pur autre vie in the property, is a mixed blessing for the creditor. ie may be
held liable for waste by the remainderman, Guthrie v. Kahle, 46 Pa. 331 (1863), and
the physical structures on the property may severely limit its usefulness to him.
1. At the time the instant suit was initiated the state insurance commissioners of
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Arkansas had authorized VALIC to conduct business
within their states. Brief for Defendants, pp. 6-7, SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1957).
2. D.C. CoDx ANN. § 35-705 (1951).
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tract, premiums are segregated in a fund invested in common stocks. The
purchaser's annuity payments are a return of his portion of the fund, the
amount of the payment varying with the market value of the stocks. The
Securities and Exchange Commission sought an injunction restraining
VALIC from selling the variable annuity policy unless and until (,1) they
registered the policy as a security in accordance with the Securities Act
of 1933 ' and (2) the company complied with the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.4 The district court entered judgment for
defendants and dismissed the complaint, holding that although the variable
annuity policy was within the purpose and intendment of the Securities
Act and the defendants were within the terms and plan of the Investment
Company Act, the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act of 1945 5
prevented extention of SEC jurisdiction over contracts and companies subject to regulation by state or District insurance departments, without the
express authorization of Congress. SEC v.Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1957).
The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to insure full and fair disclosure to prospective purchasers of securities offered for sale in interstate
commerce. 6 The act specifically exempted from its definition of "security"
any "insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract ...issued by a
corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner ...
of any State. . . .,,7 The Investment Company Act of 1940, designed to
compel diversified and sound investment by investment companies of the
money of their many small and inexperienced investors, 8 similarly exempted
"any . . . insurance company" 9 from the comprehensive controls imposed on investment institutions. Exemption of insurance from these acts
was apparently motivated by recognition of the fact that insurance was already closely regulated by state agencies and the fact that insurance policies
were not considered securities by the investment world.' 0 At the time these
acts were passed, interstate insurance was held not to be interstate commerce,'1 apparently making the exemptions in the acts little more than
3. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1952).
4. 54 STAw. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1952). National Association
of Securities Dealers was made an intervenor-plaintiff on its own motion, and Equity

Annuity Life Insurance Company was made an intervenor-defendant on its own
motion.
5. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-14 (1952) (hereinafter cited
as McCarran Act).

6. A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43 (1941);

Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106 U.

PA.

L.

Rzv. 1, 10-16 (1957).
7. 48 STAT. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (8) (1952).
8. 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1952); Breswick & Co. v. United
States, 134 F. Supp. 132, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Note, 60 YAL4 L.J. 311, 329 (1951).
9. 54 STAT. 797 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3c(3) (1952).

10. Note, 41 CoLum. L. Rlv. 269, 277 (1941).
11. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
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surplusage. 12 However, in 1944, when insurance was held to be commerce, 13 these exceptions became meaningful as the only protection that
insurance had from SEC regulation, assuming that the policies issued
could be determined to be within the definition of "security." 14 The McCarran Act of 1945 greatly tempered the impact upon insurance of the
judicial determination that insurance was commerce. The act expressed a
congressional intention that the regulation and taxation of the business
of insurance should remain in the states.' 5 It further provided that "no
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ... ." 16 Consequently, a determination that a contract or company is
part of the "business of insurance," when coupled with a finding that the
contract or company is regulated by state insurance legislation, would bar
regulation under federal acts whenever the federal acts would impair state
regulation without specifically relating to the "business of insurance." The
Securities and Investment Company Acts would have this effect)' Thus,
a conclusion that the VALIC policy is part of the "business of insurance"
is determinative that it is not subject to SEC regulation.' 8
12. Loss, Tna SrcuuaTs AcT 79 (1948).
13. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944)
(interstate sales of insurance policies held to be interstate commerce for purposes of
the Sherman Act).
14. For a discussion of transactions held to be within the act, see Note, 43 VA.
L. RPv. 699, 703-06 (1957).
15. "Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States." 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011
(1952). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).
16. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1952). After June 30,
1948, the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts were to be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent state laws did not regulate the respective areas. The applicability of the National Labor Relations and Fair Labor Standards Acts was specifically affirmed. 59 STAT. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1014
(1952).
17. E.g., § 18(f) of the 1940 act, 54 STA'r. 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)
(1952), would prohibit VALIC from selling more than one form of policy, whereas
the District Insurance Commissioner has approved several forms for sale. Brief for
Defendants, instant case, p. 34.
18. A conclusion that the VALIC policy is not part of the "business of insurance" is not determinative that the policy is subject to the provisions of the Securities
or Investment Company Acts. There would have to be further determinations (1) that
the contract or company did not fall within one of the insurance exemptions in the
acts, and (2) that it was a "security" or "investment company" as defined in the acts.
The Securities Act defines a "security" as "any note, stock treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness ... or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security'.. . "'48 STA. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77 b(1) (1952). The Investment Company Act defines an investment company as
"any issuer which: (1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes
to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has such
certificate outstanding; or (3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
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The instant court reasoned that since the VALIC policy was regulated
by the District Insurance Commissioner and the insurance commissioners
of the states in which it was offered for sale, the policy was within the
protection of the McCarran Act. 19 Implicit in this reasoning is an assumption that Congress intended the extension of state insurance regulation
to particular transactions to be determinative of whether the transaction
was part of the "business of insurance." 20 The term "business of insurance" could have been construed in several ways. Narrowly, the phrase
could have been limited to the insurance business which existed at the
time the act was passed.2 ' This construction would exclude the variable
annuity from McCarran Act protection. 22 The court also could have viewed
insurance as a generic concept to see if the variable annuity possesses the
characteristics commonly attributed to insurance. Generally, insurance is
"any contract by which one party... assumes a risk of loss that rests upon
the other. . . ." 23 The issuer of conventional annuity policies obligates
himself to make periodic payments of predetermined size from maturity
until the holder's death. In contrast, the issuer of variable annuity policies
does not obligate himself to make fixed payments. 24 Thus, he does not
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes
to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value
of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an
unconsolidated basis." 54 STAT. 797 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1952).
See note 28 infra.
19. "In view of the fact that the defendants have been chartered as insurance
companies by the District of Columbia and their questioned contracts have been approved by the Insurance Superintendent of the District ...
this Court is constrained
to hold that the broad, explicit language of the McCarran Act makes them exempt
from Federal regulation unless and until Congress provides otherwise." Instant case
at 527. The court felt that Congress must ultimately determine "the definitive classification of variable annuities" since it "involve[d] the consideration of broad principles of public policy, the effect of such classification on the insurance business and on
the investment business, and on the balance of powers between State and Federal
agencies." Instant case at 528. In light of the novel considerations involved, it
would appear that the instant court had valid reasons for this position.
20. The instant court's determination that variable annuities regulated by state
insurance agencies are exempt from SEC control might well lead to state regulation
of variable annuity sales in some states and SEC regulation of sales in other states.
It was recently held in Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n, 144 Conn. 346, 131 A2d
834 (1957), that a company authorized by state insurance laws to issue "annuity"
policies could not sell a form of variable annuity within the state. Were this company
or another to incorporate as an investment company selling variable annuities, SEC
jurisdiction could not be defeated by a claim that the policy was regulated by state
insurance authorities and therefore protected by the McCarran Act.
21. A similar approach has been taken in interpreting "insurance" as exempted
from the benefits of voluntary bankruptcy in 47 STAT. 47 (1932), 11 U.S.C. § 22
(Supp. III, 1956). In re Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 232 Fed. 199 (N.D. Cal. 1916),
held that a fraternal benefit association was not exempted from the provisions since
it was not "insurance" as it was known when the act was passed.
22. The first variable annuity program was organized in New York in 1952.
Schechter, Variable Annuity-Boon or Bane?, INs. L.J. 767 (1956).
23. VANcn, INsuRANcE § 23 (2d ed. 1930). See also Jordan v. Group Health
Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
24. The fact that VALIC offers optional provisions such as disability waiver of
premium and term life in addition to the basic variable annuity policy does not alter
the nature of the contract. VANct, op. cit. supranote 23, § 23.
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assume the risk of investment losses.25 Nor, under the variable annuity
contract, does the issuer assume the risk that policyholders will live longer
than mortality tables indicate. 26 Both of these risks are born by the policyholders as a group.27 On the other hand, the variable annuity does conform to conventional annuities to the extent that the holder is assured of
periodic payments for life. Possession of this one attribute of a conventional
annuity might be thought sufficient to include the variable annuity within
the definition of insurance, but it is not conclusive of that result.2 The
issue in the instant case should not be resolved by resort to a mere comparison of similar or dissimilar characteristics where the result of the
comparison will be at best inconclusive. A sounder resolution of the question would seem to require reference to the purposes respectively of fed29
eral securities regulation and state insurance regulation.
25. The variable annuity plan can best be understood by dividing it into pay-in
and withdrawal periods. During the pay-in period premiums of all policyholders are

segregated in a fund invested in common stocks. Each time a policyholder pays a
premium he is credited with a number of units, determined by dividing the amount of
the premium, after deduction of company expenses, by the value of a unit at the
time the premium is paid. On any particular day the value of a unit is computed by
dividing the market value of the securities held by the fund on that date by the number of units then issued to policyholders. At maturity, i.e., at the end of the pay-in

period, the policyholder is credited with a sum of money equal to the number of units
he has accrued during the pay-in period multiplied by the value of a unit at that

time. The first annuity payment is determined from this sum in light of the annuitant's life expectancy. At this time a constant factor to be used in determining the
amount of all future payments is also computed by dividing the amount of the first

payment by the value of a unit. Subsequent payments until the annuitant's death are

computed by multiplying this constant factor by the value of a unit at the time each

payment comes due. Since the value of a unit is directly proportional to the market
value of the securities in the fund, the risk of investment fluctuations is placed on

the annuitant in the form of fluctuating payments.
26. See note 25 supra. The value of a unit is also directly proportional to the
number of units held by all policyholders, and a policyholder's units are not canceled
until his death. Therefore, if policyholders as a group live longer than mortality
tables indicated, payments to all annuitants are reduced proportionately.
27. From the viewpoint of the policyholder, he has divested himself of the risI2
that he will outlive his savings by investing them in an annuity. But this risk has been
passed to the policyholders as a group rather than to the issuer.
28. See note 18 supra. The reasoning employed to determine whether or not the
policy is "insurance" would also be applicable to a determination of whether the
policy was an "annuity" or a "security." One writer on the subject has distinguished the
variable annuity from a mutual fund in four aspects: (1) the variable annuitant is
assured of receiving payments for life, (2) he may designate beneficiaries and exercise settlement options for them, (3) he may receive limited protection from creditors, and (4) he may purchase waiver of premium benefits. Note, 43 VA. L. Rv. 699,

702 (1957).

29. A determination that the variable annuity is a "security" within the meaning
of the Securities Act of 1933 will not remove it from state control. Crosby v. Weil,
382 Ill. 538, 48 N.E.2d 386 (1943), held that a state security regulation was valid
as applied to an intrastate transaction. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel.
State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), sustained a state security regulation which
did not conflict with federal regulation as applied to an out-of-state business soliciting sales by mail within the regulating state. Both of these decisions were reached in
light of § 18 of the 1933 act, 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1952), which provides that "nothing in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission . . . of any State. . ....
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The apparent explanation for federal reliance on state insurance regulation is that Congress felt the states had traditionally and adequately
regulated the insurance business and were thus well equipped to continue
to protect the public from insurance abuses. 30 On the other hand, it was
found that the states had failed to properly control security sales and
that only federal regulation could protect the public.31 If the nature of the
variable annuity is such that there are inherent risks to the purchaser
which state insurance regulation is not designed to prevent, it should not
be within the "business of insurance" as contemplated by the McCarran
Act nor within the exceptions to the Securities and Investment Company
Acts. State insurance regulation, with emphasis on statutory requirements
administered by authorities having power to grant or withhold the privilege of selling insurance within the state, is primarily concerned with
maintenance of adequate funds available to pay claims. 32 Typical of these
requirements are limits on the size of individual policies, 33 reserve requirements,3 and provisions for the making of deposits to guarantee that obligations are met.ss These requirements have little meaning to the purchaser
of a contract which does not obligate the company to pay any specific
amount and limits the purchaser's claim to a portion of a fund invested
entirely in common stocks. 36 With regard to protecting the holder of a
variable annuity contract, state insurance regulations governing the investment of insurance company funds are of primary significance. In this
respect the state laws are far from uniform. Among the most restrictive
is New York where common stock purchases by insurance companies must
be diversified so that no more than two per cent of these investments are
in the stock of any one company, and are limited to stocks listed on national security exchanges and which have paid dividends for ten years preceding the purchase. 37 At the other extreme is Arkansas where no specific
limitations are imposed as to the common stocks that can be purchased,
the state insurance commissioner having the right to disapprove of any
investment at his discretion. 38 In the event that insurance commissioners,
30. S. R ..No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
31. See 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)(5) (1952). See also Frey,
supra note 6, at 3-8.
32. HuZBNxR, Lis INsuRANC_ 479-84 (4th ed. 1950).
33. Ibid. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STtATr. c. 73, § 884 (Smith-Hurd

1940).
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Coxso. COD ANN. tit. 27, § 73 (Supp. 1957).
35. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 73, § 890 (Smith-Hurd 1940).
36. See notes 25-26 supra.
37. N.Y. CoNSOL. COD ANN. tit. 27, § 81(13) (Supp. 1957). This section also
places a limit of five per cent on the portion of total assets which may be invested in
common stocks. It would seem that this provision would bar variable annuity companies from incorporating under the present New York laws.
38. ARM SmT. ANN. § 66-235 (1947). No restriction is placed on the percentage
of total assets that may be invested in common stocks. Therefore, the state insurance
commissioner apparently would have discretion to determine whether a variable annuity company could organize under the Arkansas statute.
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in states where they are vested with broad discretion, permit variable annuity companies to make relatively speculative investments, 39 the inadequacies of disclosure provisions of state insurance laws would make it
difficult for the prospective purchaser to inform himself of the nature of
the risk that he would be taking by investing in the variable annuity contract. The usual requirement of state insurance laws is that a company
annually file with the state insurance commissioner a report of its financial
status, which might or might not include a statement of the particular
securities held by the company for its annuitants. 40 Even if it is necessary
for the company to include in its report a particularized list of its investments, such a report would not be readily available to the prospective
purchaser of the annuity contract at the time when he is solicited to join
4
the plan. '
In contrast with these inadequacies of state insurance regulation are
the provisions of the Securities and Investment Company Acts. Instead of
imposing regulations designed to make all securities offered for sale sound
investments, the Securities Act relies on full disclosure to each prospective
purchaser of relevant facts about the security being offered for sale. 4 2 By

requiring sellers to furnish to the SEC and to each prospective purchaser
such information as a description of the security, the remuneration of officers
and directors of the offering company, the method of determining the price
of the security, and details as to the presently held investments of the company,43 the purchaser is able to determine for himself the desirability of the
investment. Regulation under the Investment Company Act is also designed
to bring about proper management of investors' money by prohibiting investment in ventures in which directors and officers have an interest 44 and by
requiring diversified purchases. 45 Further, the companies are required to
furnish holders of a share of the investment fund a semi-annual statement
of investment activities 46 and to permit them to withdraw their share of
the fund without penalty if company investments are deemed inappropri39. The restrictions applied by jurisdictions to investments of domestic insurance
corporations are generally applied to foreign companies selling insurance within that
jurisdiction. See D.C. CoDm ANN. § 35-535 (1951); N.Y. CoNsoL. Coma ANN. tit. 27,
§ 90 (Supp. 1957).
40. For an outline of existing disclosure provisions see HutmR, op. cit. supra
note 32, at 481.
41. There would appear to be a danger that managers of variable annuity funds
will make investments offering high prospective returns, although with some risk to
capital, in an effort to make their fund attractive to prospective purchasers of conventional annuities and other variable annuity plans.
42. For a general discussion of the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, see
ACT AND THE S.E.C. (1948).

McCoRMICK, UNDMRSTANDING THZ SECt)RIs

43. 48 STAT. 88, 91 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1952).
44. 54 STAT. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f) (1952). The Investment Companies Act is discussed generally in a Note, 41 CoLUm. L. Rzv. 269 (1941).
45. 54 STAT. 808 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(c) (1952).
46. 54 STAT. 836 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(d) (1952).
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ate. 47 These provisions would be of particular benefit to the variable annuitant since his returns are wholly dependent on the manner in which the
annuity fund is managed.4 Since these safeguards afforded by the federal
acts to the individual investor are hiot found under state insurance regulation, it would seem that the instant court should have placed the variable
49
annuity under federal security regulation.
47. 54 STAT. 829 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(c) (1952).
48. Under 54 STAT. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a) (3) (1952), the holders
of shares of the investment company must be notified of and approve of any change
in the policy with respect to concentration of investments in any particular industry
or group of industries.
49. Federal jurisdiction is made particularly advantageous by Security Act provisions for service of process outside the district of the court hearing the case and for
immunity from prosecution for witnesses who might otherwise refuse to answer questions on the grounds that the answers might tend to be self-incriminating. 48 STAT.
86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1952).

